@incollection{fdi:010091414, title = {{C}oalition formation with multiple alternatives of interdependent tasks}, author = {{S}klab, {Y}oucef and {A}knine, {S}. and {S}hehory, {O}. and {A}riouat {S}klab, {H}anane}, editor = {}, language = {{ENG}}, abstract = {{I}n this paper, we consider the problem of coalition formation in multi-agent systems that exhibit externalities. {W}e consider multiple self-interested agents each of which has a goal it needs to achieve. {E}ach agent may have several alternative sets of dependent tasks leading it to achieve its goal. {E}xecution of tasks may be more beneficial when done by a group of agents and not by a single agent. {I}n fact, to achieve their goals, the agents need to form sequential interdependent coalitions to perform their tasks within an alternative. {H}owever, tasks dependencies lead to coalitions dependencies. {T}o account for the effects of each coalition on the rest of the possible coalitions, the agents need to form all needed coalitions at once. {T}his problem, denoted here as a {O}ne-shot {C}oalition {F}ormation {P}roblem ({OC}.{FP}), is quite challenging and particularly important for multi-agent system. {W}e describe it and present a multi-lateral negotiation mechanism that solves it by allowing the agents to conduct iterative negotiations on their respective tasks within their alternatives. {A} heuristic-based approach that considers the distance between each agent's desired alternative and other agents' proposed coalitions is introduced and evaluated.}, keywords = {}, booktitle = {{V}erification and evaluation of computer and communication systems ({VEC}o{S} 2021) : 15th {I}nternational {C}onference, {VEC}o{S} 2021, virtual event, november 22-23, 2021, revised selected papers}, numero = {13187}, pages = {75--90}, address = {{C}ham}, publisher = {{S}pringer}, series = {{L}ecture {N}otes in {C}omputer {S}cience}, year = {2022}, DOI = {10.1007/978-3-030-98850-0_6}, ISBN = {978-3-030-98849-4}, URL = {https://www.documentation.ird.fr/hor/fdi:010091414}, }