@article{fdi:010090469,
  title = {{D}ilemma of total allowable catch ({TAC}s) allocated as shareable quotas : applying a bio-economic game-theoretical approach to euro-mauritanian fisheries agreements},
  author = {{K}ane, {E}.{A}. and {B}all, {A}.{C}. and {B}rehmer, {P}atrice},
  editor = {},
  language = {{ENG}},
  abstract = {{T}he recent fisheries management approach by {M}auritania recommends that {T}otal {A}llowable {C}atch ({TAC}) quotas, identified as essential for maintaining fish stocks, be shared (allocated) among fishing fleets operating in {M}auritanian waters.  {H}owever, the efficiency of such management regulations is debated. 

{T}his issue can be identified as the typical dilemma between distant-fishing countries and coastal countries. {W}e developed a theoretical model to determine how to allocate {TAC} quotas between the fishing fleets of {M}auritania ({RIM}) and the {E}uropean {U}nion ({EU}). {W}e discuss the various procedures and conditions for optimizing the allocation of fishing quotas (by country) in context of the {N}ash equilibrium.  {W}e found that both equilibria are characterized by strategic interactions of the exploitation that influence both the supply of {TAC} quotas available on the market and the cost of externalities due to {RIM}'s dependence on financial compensation

by the {EU} and available {TAC} quotas.},
  keywords = {{MAURITANIE} ; {EUROPE}},
  booktitle = {},
  journal = {{A}quaculture and {F}isheries},
  volume = {[{E}arly access]},
  numero = {},
  pages = {en ligne [8 ]},
  ISSN = {2096-1758},
  year = {2022},
  DOI = {10.1016/j.aaf.2022.02.008},
  URL = {https://www.documentation.ird.fr/hor/fdi:010090469},
}