@article{fdi:010079067,
  title = {{C}oalition formation with dynamically changing externalities},
  author = {{S}klab, {Y}oucef and {A}knine, {S}. and {S}hehory, {O}. and {T}ari, {A}.},
  editor = {},
  language = {{ENG}},
  abstract = {{W}e consider multiple self-interested bounded-rational agents each of which has a goal it needs to achieve. {G}oals are achievable by executing a set of interdependent tasks. {S}ome tasks exhibit time dependencies and may require sequential execution. {F}or each agent, there may be several alternative sets of tasks that can achieve the goal. {E}xecution of alternatives, may be more beneficial when done by a group of agents and not by a single agent. {T}o jointly achieve goals, agents may form interdependent coalitions. {S}uch coalition formation is computationally intractable. {W}e nevertheless seek a practical solution that is not necessarily optimal yet acceptable by the agents. {A} solution where agents examine only coalitions in which they are members is inapplicable, as externalities are a major factor given task interdependencies. {I}n this paper we study this coalition formation problem. {W}e describe the problem and introduce a novel {M}ulti-lateral {N}egotiation {P}rotocol ({MNP}) that solves it by forming interdependent coalitions. {W}e allow agents to heuristically make gradual concessions, revise their proposals and converge on specific alternatives, and nevertheless increase their expected gains.},
  keywords = {{C}oalition formation ; {C}oalitions externalities ; {D}ynamically changing externalities ; {T}ask dependencies ; {M}ulti-agent negotiation},
  booktitle = {},
  journal = {{E}ngineering {A}pplications of {A}rtificial {I}ntelligence},
  volume = {91},
  numero = {},
  pages = {art. 103577 [20 p.]},
  ISSN = {0952-1976},
  year = {2020},
  DOI = {10.1016/j.engappai.2020.103577},
  URL = {https://www.documentation.ird.fr/hor/fdi:010079067},
}