@techreport{fdi:010061542,
  title = {{P}olitics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of {G}hana, 1996-2004},
  author = {{A}ndr{\'e}, {P}. and {M}espl{\'e}-{S}omps, {S}andrine},
  editor = {},
  language = {{ENG}},
  abstract = {{T}he body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic {A}frican countries. {E}mpirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. {O}ur results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of {G}hana. {W}e observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the {NDC} was in power. {W}e posit that this finding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. {I}ndeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. {O}ur analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either.},
  keywords = {{INVESTISSEMENT} {PUBLIC} ; {DEPENSES} {PUBLIQUES} ; {DEMOCRATIE} ; {ECONOMIE} {POLITIQUE} ; {DECENTRALISATION} ; {INFRASTRUCTURE} ; {ELECTION} ; {ECONOMETRIE} ; {HISTOIRE} {POLITIQUE} ; {BIEN} {PUBLIC} ; {DEMOCRATISATION} ; {GHANA}},
  address = {{P}aris},
  publisher = {{DIAL}},
  series = {{D}ocument de {T}ravail - {DIAL}},
  pages = {33  multigr.},
  year = {2011},
  URL = {https://www.documentation.ird.fr/hor/fdi:010061542},
}