Sklab Youcef, Aknine S., Shehory O., Ariouat Sklab Hanane. (2022). Coalition formation with multiple alternatives of interdependent tasks. In :
Nouri A. (ed.), Wu W. (ed.), Barkaoui K. (ed.), Li Z. (ed.). Verification and evaluation of computer and communication systems (VECoS 2021) : 15th International Conference, VECoS 2021, virtual event, november 22-23, 2021, revised selected papers. Cham : Springer, 75-90. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; 13187). VECOS : Verification and Evaluation of Computer and Communication Systems, 15., [En ligne], 2021/11/22-2021/11/23. ISBN 978-3-030-98849-4.
Titre du document
Coalition formation with multiple alternatives of interdependent tasks
Année de publication
2022
Auteurs
Sklab Youcef, Aknine S., Shehory O., Ariouat Sklab Hanane
In
Nouri A. (ed.), Wu W. (ed.), Barkaoui K. (ed.), Li Z. (ed.), Verification and evaluation of computer and communication systems (VECoS 2021) : 15th International Conference, VECoS 2021, virtual event, november 22-23, 2021, revised selected papers
Source
Cham : Springer, 2022,
75-90 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; 13187). ISBN 978-3-030-98849-4
Colloque
VECOS : Verification and Evaluation of Computer and Communication Systems, 15., [En ligne], 2021/11/22-2021/11/23
In this paper, we consider the problem of coalition formation in multi-agent systems that exhibit externalities. We consider multiple self-interested agents each of which has a goal it needs to achieve. Each agent may have several alternative sets of dependent tasks leading it to
achieve its goal. Execution of tasks may be more beneficial when done by a group of agents and not by a single agent. In fact, to achieve their goals, the agents need to form sequential interdependent coalitions to perform their tasks within an alternative. However, tasks dependencies
lead to coalitions dependencies. To account for the effects of each coalition on the rest of the possible coalitions, the agents need to form all needed coalitions at once. This problem, denoted here as a One-shot Coalition Formation Problem (OC.FP), is quite challenging and particularly
important for multi-agent system. We describe it and present a multi-lateral negotiation mechanism that solves it by allowing the agents to conduct iterative negotiations on their respective tasks within their alternatives. A heuristic-based approach that considers the distance between
each agent's desired alternative and other agents' proposed coalitions is introduced and evaluated.
Plan de classement
Informatique [122]
Localisation
Fonds IRD [F B010091414]
Identifiant IRD
fdi:010091414
