@techreport{fdi:010065738,
  title = {{S}upervision and project performance : a principal-agent approach},
  author = {{C}hauvet, {L}isa and {C}ollier, {P}. and {F}uster, {A}.},
  editor = {},
  language = {{ENG}},
  abstract = {{T}his paper extends and applies principal-agent theory to the performance of donor projects. {T}here is variation in the degree of divergence between the interests of the donor (the principal) and the recipient government (the agent). {F}urther, the effort expended on observation of the agent is a control variable. {W}e show that in a wide range of circumstances an implication of principal-agent theory is that the principal should put greater effort into observation the wider is the divergence of interest with the agent. {W}e then test this prediction using data on {W}orld {B}ank project performance. {W}e measure the degree of divergence between donor and recipient interests, as perceived by the donor, through a donor classification system of recipient governments. {C}onsistent with the theory, we find that donor supervision of projects is significantly more effective in improving project performance where interests are widely divergent. {H}owever, donors do not put more effort into the supervision of projects in such cases.},
  keywords = {{AIDE} {AU} {DEVELOPPEMENT} ; {PROJET} {DE} {DEVELOPPEMENT} ; {ECONOMETRIE} ; {MODELISATION} ; {ECONOMIE} {DU} {DEVELOPPEMENT} ; {THEORIE} {PRINCIPAL} {AGENT}},
  address = {{P}aris},
  publisher = {{DIAL}},
  series = {{D}ocuments de {T}ravail - {DIAL}},
  pages = {36  multigr.},
  year = {2015},
  URL = {https://www.documentation.ird.fr/hor/fdi:010065738},
}