@article{fdi:010064158,
  title = {{C}ompensation and {R}ewards for {E}nvironmental {S}ervices ({CRES}) and efficient design of contracts in developing countries. {B}ehavioral insights from a natural field experiment},
  author = {{C}lot, {S}. and {A}ndriamahefazafy, {F}. and {G}rolleau, {G}. and {I}banez, {L}. and {M}{\'e}ral, {P}hilippe},
  editor = {},
  language = {{ENG}},
  abstract = {{T}he use of economic incentives for biodiversity (mostly {C}ompensation and {R}eward for {E}nvironmental {S}ervices including {P}ayment for {ES}) has been widely supported in the past decades and became the main innovative policy tools for biodiversity conservation worldwide. {T}hese policy tools are often based on the insight that rational actors perfectly weigh the costs and benefits of adopting certain behaviors and well-crafted economic incentives and disincentives will lead to socially desirable development scenarios. {T}his rationalist mode of thought has provided interesting insights and results, but it also misestimates the context by which 'real individuals' come to decisions, and the multitude of factors influencing development sequences. {I}n this study, our goal is to examine how these policies can take advantage of some unintended behavioral reactions that might in return impact, either positively or negatively, general policy performances. {W}e test the effect of income's origin ('{L}ow effort' based money vs. '{H}igh effort' based money) on spending decisions ({N}ecessity vs. {S}uperior goods) and subsequent pro social preferences ({F}uture pro-environmental behavior) within {M}adagascar rural areas, using a natural field experiment. {O}ur results show that money obtained under low effort leads to different consumption patterns than money obtained under high efforts: superior goods are more salient in the case of low effort money. {I}n parallel, money obtained under low effort leads to subsequent higher pro social behavior. {C}ompensation and rewards policies for ecosystem services may mobilize knowledge on behavioral biases to improve their design and foster positive spillovers on their development goals.},
  keywords = {{C}ompensation and rewards for ecosystem services ; {M}ental accounting ; {S}elf-licensing ; {N}atural field experiment ; {TIERS} {MONDE} ; {PAYS} {EN} {DEVELOPPEMENT}},
  booktitle = {},
  journal = {{E}cological {E}conomics},
  volume = {113},
  numero = {},
  pages = {85--96},
  ISSN = {0921-8009},
  year = {2015},
  DOI = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.02.021},
  URL = {https://www.documentation.ird.fr/hor/fdi:010064158},
}